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NOTE
AN ARGUMENT FOR PRE-AWARD ATTACHMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION UNDER
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
INTRODUCTION
Commerce has evolved from neighborhood trading into complex
international transactions. Along with profits from expanding foreign
markets has come the complexity of international litigation when com-
mercial agreements break down. The fear that applying the law of one
party's forum may result in prejudice to the opposing foreign party'
and the threat of leaving a victorious plaintiff with an unenforceable
judgment2 make litigation an undesirable means of resolving interna-
tional commercial disputes.
Arbitration is an alternative that avoids the delay and expense of
international commercial litigation.3 Arbitration also allows parties
to determine, before a controversy arises, who will resolve their dis-
pute and what the basis of its resolution will be.4 Because of these
1. See Sanders, Trends In the Field of International Commercial Arbitration, II
RECUEIL DES CouRS 205, 216 (1975). Lack of judicial familiarity with foreign procedural
and substantive law further complicates the litigation of controversies arising from interna-
tional transactions. See Burnstein, Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes, 6
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 569, 569-72 (1965). Because arbitrators are often experts in
the commercial field underlying the arbitration, they are often more perceptive in examin-
ing the facts of a dispute than a judge would be. Further, arbitral procedure is generally
more flexible than court procedure.
2. A plaintiff's success in one jurisdiction does not ensure that a foreign court will
enforce his judgment. It may be mere chance that the defendant's assets are located in the
same foreign arbitral forum that the parties chose for its neutrality, experience, or other
qualities important at the time of signing the contract. See Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental
Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1982) (maritime attachment permitted to
ensure availability of security to satisfy arbitral award).
3. See, e.g., Domke, International Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE 1960 INsTrrITU ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD 131.
4. It is widely recognized that the law chosen by the parties will govern the pro-
ceedings of an arbitral tribunal. .. . Even if the parties have made no express
choice of law, they have chosen to resolve their disputes by arbitration and, hence,
authorized the arbitrators to determine the legal principles applicable to specific
issues before the tribunal.
Trooboff & Goldstein, Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1958 New York Convention: Expe-
rience to Date in the U.S. Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 469, 476 (1977). See Mobil Oil Indone-
sia Inc. v. Asamerva Oil (Indonesia) Ltd., 56 A.D.2d 339, 342, 392 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616
(1977) (when parties agree to have subject matter of dispute submitted to arbitration, pro-
cedural questions are to be resolved by arbitrators).
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advantages, arbitration is less likely to destroy ongoing commercial
relations than litigation, explaining the marked preference for arbitra-
tion as a means to resolve international commercial disputes.5
Arbitration is effective only if the parties abide by their agreement
to arbitrate and honor the arbitral decision. When a party refuses to
arbitrate or seems unlikely to honor the outcome, judicial remedies,
such as pre-award attachment and garnishment, may be useful to
coerce cooperation. It is uncertain whether an arbitral clause in an
international commercial agreement should preclude a court from
granting a motion for pre-award attachment before the commence-
ment or resolution of an arbitral proceeding. United States courts6
and commentators7 are split in their positions on whether pre-award
attachment is inimical to the United Nations Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
Convention). 8
5. See S. LAzARUS, I. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. COLLINS, B. GIEDT, R. HOLTON, P.
MATTHEWS & G. WILLARD, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPuTES 168 (1965); Comment,
International Commercial Arbitration Under the United Nations Convention and the
Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 WASH. L. REv. 441, 442 (1972).
6. Few cases have forced judicial resolution of whether an arbitration agreement that
is enforceable under the rules of the New York Convention precludes the granting of
attachment before an arbitral decision is reached, that is, pre-award attachment. The most
recent cases suggest a discernible trend favoring pre-award attachment. See Drys Shipping
Corp. v. Freights, Sub-Freights, Charter Hire, 558 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1977) (in rem attach-
ment upheld on theory that arbitral agreement does not preclude traditional maritime pro-
cedure); Construction Exporting Enter., Uneca v. Nikki Maritime Ltd., 558 F. Supp. 1372
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (upholding maritime attachment under New York Convention as indistin-
guishable from attachment under state statutory and decisional law), discussed infra note
146 ; Paramount Carriers Corp. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(maritime attachment upheld to give court jurisdiction to compel enforcement of arbitral
provisions); Compania de Navegacion y Financiera Bosnia, S.A. v. National Unity Marine
Salvage Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (pre-award attachment upheld when
defendant had created confusion as to correct corporate name); Atlas Chartering Serv., Inc.
v. World Trade Group, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (maritime attachment
upheld as compatible with purpose of New York Convention); Carolina Power & Light Co.
v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (attachment allowed under New York
Convention based on acceptance of attachment in U.S. Arbitration Act cases posing similar
question); Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie, S.A., 430 F. Supp. 88
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (maritime attachment granted as consistent with the language of the New
York Convention). But see McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032,
1038 (3d Cir. 1974) (denying attachment as inconsistent with the New York Convention's
mandate to "refer. . . the parties to arbitration"); Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v.
P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (attach-
ment denied based on McCreary analysis of the hazards of exposing parties to the vagaries
of state attachment procedures), discussed infra note 128 ; Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobe-
cane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 456 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1982) (New York Conven-
tion does not allow attachment pending arbitral proceedings).
7. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
8. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 (effective for United States Dec. 29, 1970) [hereinafter cited as the New York
Convention]. Because the U.N. Conference took place in New York City, the resulting
Convention is frequently referred to as the New York Convention.
PRE-AWARD ATTACHMENT
This Note argues that pre-award attachment should be allowed to
supplement the procedures of the New York Convention. First, the
Note shows that, rather than contravening the Convention's goal of
uniformity, pre-award attachment actually promotes the Convention's
underlying objectives of providing international standards for the rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 9 Second, the
Note presents U.S. cases involving maritime attachment under the
Convention as evidence of a strong U.S. policy in favor of attachment
and argues that this policy should be extended to all international arbi-
tral proceedings governed by the Convention.10 The Note concludes
with a model that suggests that courts consider the law to be applied
and the location of the arbitral forum in determining whether to grant
a motion for pre-award attachment.1"
I. PRE-AWARD ATTACHMENT UNDER THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION
A. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AGREEMENTS BEFORE THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION
Before the enactment of the United States Arbitration Act of
192512 (the Arbitration Act), U.S. courts generally refused to enforce
contractual provisions for arbitral resolution of commercial disputes.
13
Passage of the Arbitration Act ended judicial hostility14 by validating
enforcement of arbitral agreements in all commercial areas under fed-
eral jurisdiction.15 Nevertheless, passage of the Arbitration Act gener-
ated questions concerning the necessity or fairness of a court's
granting motions for provisional remedies to protect parties' interests
during arbitration.1 6 This Note focuses exclusively on the remedy of
9. See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
12. Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1982)).
13. For a discussion of judicial reluctance to enforce agreements to arbitrate, see Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). See also United States v. Columbus
Marine Corp. (The Schoon), 8 F.2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1925). This judicial hostility was based
on the belief that arbitral agreements are intended to rob courts of their jurisdiction. See
Comment, International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 5, at 443-45.
14. The history of judicial attitudes toward arbitration was summarized in Kulukundis
Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp. (The Mount Helmos), 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir.
1942) (the Arbitration Act should not be construed narrowly) (per Frank, J.). Even in
1938, one federal court refused to bind a party attempting to escape from an arbitration
provision, stating, "Arbitration sometimes involves perils that even surpass the perils of the
sea." In re Canadian Gulf Line (The Soloy), 98 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1938).
15. In enacting the Arbitration Act, Congress relied on the commerce and admiralty
powers of the Constitution. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
16. For two cases in which the courts found that pre-award attachment was consistent
with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, see infra notes 18-20.
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pre-award attachment, which is used to achieve jurisdiction over a
defendant in order to compel arbitration or to preserve assets pending
completion of the arbitral process.17
Two cases that upheld pre-award attachment illustrate U.S.
courts' position that pre-award attachment was proper in cases involv-
ing arbitration agreements that were enforceable under the Arbitration
Act.18 In one case, the plaintiff procured attachment before attempt-
ing to enforce the contractual provision to arbitrate. 19 In the other
case, the plaintiff procured attachment when the selection of an arbi-
tral panel was nearly finished and arbitration was about to begin.20
Thus, the courts' obligation under the Arbitration Act to enforce arbi-
tral agreements, which precluded judicial resolution on the merits, did
not bar pre-award attachment to preserve a defendant's assets.
Instead, the courts recognized that provisional remedies such as
attachment promote the arbitral process by ensuring the enforceability
of arbitral awards.21
17. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL §§ 2931-2934 (1973) (discussing the mechanics of attachment). Attachment
in federal court is accomplished through use of FED. R. Civ. P. 64. This rule authorizes
use of provisional remedies at the beginning and throughout the course of legal action in
the manner provided by the law of the state in which the federal court sits. If a request for
attachment is successful, the court will retain custody of the property until the controversy
has been resolved. The grounds for attachment vary considerably between states; most
require a showing of fraud or some proof of an attempt to conceal or remove assets from
the jurisdiction.
State attachment procedures are subject to the statutes and Constitution of the United
States. For a discussion of the constitutionality of pre-arbitral attachment in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions upholding certain state sequestration procedures, see Polar Ship-
ping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 637-40 (9th Cir. 1982).
18. Compagnia Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A. v. International Union
Lines, Ltd., 17 Misc. 2d 497, 187 N.Y.S.2d 449 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); American Reserve
Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 322, 79 N.E.2d 425, 79 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1948).
19. In American Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 322, 79 N.E.2d 425, 79
N.Y.S.2d 322 (1948), two insurance companies entered into a reinsurance agreement con-
taining an arbitration clause. When the Chinese company avoided an obligation to pay
premiums to its American counterpart, the American company brought suit and procured
ex parte attachment of the defendant's assets in New York. The court denied the defend-
ant's motion to vacate the attachment, stating, "[I]t is not even proper for the defendant in
such an action to plead the arbitration agreement as a defense or counterclaim." 297 N.Y.
at 326-27, 79 N.E.2d at 427, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27.
20. Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A. v. International Union Lines,
Ltd., 17 Misc. 2d 497, 187 N.Y.S.2d 449 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (following American
Reserve). See supra note 19.
21. The most common reason for arbitration is to substitute the speedy decision of
specialists in the field for that of juries and judges; and that is entirely consistent
with a desire to make as effective as possible recovery upon awards, after they have
been made, which is what provisional remedies do.
Murray Oil Prod. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1944) (per Learned
Hand, J.). But see Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas
Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying attachment, because it would
have placed the defendant under undue pressure to settle in order to release his attached
assets). See generally Kheel, New York's Amended Attachment Statute: A Prejudgment
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Domestic cases granting attachment under the Arbitration Act
evince the pro-attachment posture of U.S. courts. Nonetheless, move-
ment to an international arena complicates the question of whether
courts should grant motions for pre-award attachment. Although
attachment would ensure recovery of an arbitral award against a for-
eign party, this advantage must be considered against the backdrop of
international agreements governing the arbitral process.
B. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
(THE NEW YORK CONVENTION)
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention)22 was
drafted to encourage the recognition and enforcement of international
commercial arbitration agreements and to promote international uni-
formity in the standards underlying enforcement of arbitral awards.
23
The United States did not become a signatory until 1970.24
Remedy in Need of Further Revision, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 199 (1978). Methods exist,
however, for controlling abuse. Due process requires the plaintiff to post bond before
attachment is granted and to give notice and the opportunity for a hearing prior to depriv-
ing a person of "any significant property interest." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82
(1972). But see Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1982) (due process does not require notice because notice can defeat purposes of attach-
ment-obtaining jurisdiction and security).
22. New York Convention, supra note 8.
23. The New York Convention was the culmination of a request by the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to develop a means for enforcing foreign arbitral awards.
See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1059 (1961). As a
result of the ICC's request, the United Nations Economic and Social Council established a
committee to produce a Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. The text of the draft convention is in U.N. Doc. E/2704 and U.N.
CoR.R. 1 (1955). For a list of the representatives and observers at the U.N. Conference, see
U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/INF.I/Rev.2 (1958). See generally A. VAN DEN BERG, THE
NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981); INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: NEw YORK CONVENTION (G. Gaja ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION]; Sanders, A Twenty Years'Review of the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269
(1979).
24. For the reasons behind the Unites States' delay in ratifying the New York Conven-
tion, see Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United
States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign ArbitralAwards, 3 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1971). The author sets forth four reasons: the
delegation believed (1) that adopting the Convention in a manner that avoids conffict with
state law would remove any advantages that the United States could gain from ratification;
(2) that an acceptance that assures any advantages to the United States would necessarily
invalidate most states' arbitration laws; (3) that the United States did not have a sufficient
legal basis for accepting an international agreement in the area of arbitration; and (4) that
the Convention contained principles of arbitral law that were undesirable for U.S. endorse-
ment. These reasons are also advanced in Quigley, supra note 23, at 1074 n.108. Sixty-one
nations had become members by January 1, 1983. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF
THE LEGAL ADVISOR, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIE AND OTHER INTERNA-
1985]
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In enacting legislation to implement the New York Convention,
Congress maintained the old Arbitration Act, 25 designating it as
Chapter I, and added the implementing legislation for the New York
Convention as Chapter 11.26 In order to resolve potential conflicts
between the old Arbitration Act and the New York Convention, Con-
gress specified that Chapter I would govern only when it does not con-
flict with Chapter 11.27
Cases that fall within the terms of the Convention may be
removed to federal court.28 When federal courts cannot apply the
New York Convention to a particular international commercial con-
troversy,29 other mechanisms are often available for the recognition
TIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1983, at 202
(1983).
25. Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1982); see Aksen, supra note 24, at 14-15.
26. Chapter II of the Arbitration Act specifies the procedure for cases under the New
York Convention. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982). It includes a provision granting jurisdic-
tion to federal courts regardless of the amount in controversy, § 203; a venue provision,
§ 204; a provision for the right to remove cases from state court, § 205; and a provision for
the period for confirming a foreign award, § 207.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 208.
The 1970 Arbitration Act limited the application of the original 1925 Arbitration Act to
three areas: to purely domestic arbitration, to which the New York Convention as codified
in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 would not apply; to delineation of the outer boundaries of the 1970
Arbitration Act under the 1925 Act's provisions; and to international arbitral agreements
to which the New York Convention is inapplicable. See generally Comment, International
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 5, at 454. Article 1(3) of the New York Convention
allows two reservations to countries acceding to the Convention: (1) "any State may on the
basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforce-
ment of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State"; (2) a State declar-
ing ratification of the New York Convention "may also declare that it will apply the
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or
not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such
declaration." New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1(3). The United States has
adopted both of these reservations. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 (reciprocity), 202 (commercial
limitation).
The Arbitration Act's definition of "commerce" may control the definition of a "com-
mercial" agreement:
"[Commerce", as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or
with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Terri-
tory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any
State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). For a more liberal interpretation, see Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi
Compania Maritima, 477 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (purely foreign transactions
not excluded from coverage under New York Convention).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 205. For one court's interpretation of this removal jurisdiction, see infra
text accompanying notes 54-56.
29. Article V of the New York Convention, supra note 8, enumerates several grounds
upon which a member nation may refuse to enforce an arbitral award rendered in another
member country, including incapacity of the parties, invalidity of the agreement under the
applicable law, and lack of notice of the arbitration to the losing party. A country may also
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and enforcement of the underlying arbitral agreement. 30
The provision of the New York Convention that has generated
controversy among U.S. courts over the availability of pre-award
attachment is Article II, section 3:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitra-
tion, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.3
1
This controversy over the availability of pre-award attachment arises
because neither the language of the New York Convention nor its
implementing legislation 32 indicates whether the Convention was
intended to prevent a court from granting a motion for pre-award
attachment. 33 Similarly, the legislative history of the Convention's
articles34 and its introductory materials 35 provide little from which to
refuse to enforce an arbitral award if it would be contrary to public policy. It is generally
recognized that the public policy defense should be construed narrowly. See Note, The
Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 228 (1977). For a detailed discussion of the Convention's provisions for
defenses to enforcement and a comparison of how the courts of the various member nations
have interpreted them, see A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 23, at 275-357. The Supreme
Court suggested that the arbitrators' manifest disregard of the law would warrant refusal to
enforce an award under Chapter I of the Arbitration Act. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
436-37 (1953) (dicta).
30. See generally Note, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration Agreements
and Awards Not Subject to the New York Convention, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1982) (other
statutory means for enforcement include the 1925 Arbitration Act; the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation; State law; and conversion of the foreign arbitral award to
a foreign judgment in order to bring that judgment to the United States for enforcement
through reciprocity under the doctrine of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)).
31. New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. II, § 3 (emphasis added); 9 U.S.C.
§ 201 (1982). The first two sections of Article II provide,
1. Each Contracting State shall tecognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relation-
ship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settle-
ment by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract
of an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange
of letters or telegrams.
New York Convention, supra note 8; 9 U.S.C. § 201.
32. See generally Asken, supra note 24, at 14-23 (summarizing the implementing
legislation).
33. "The Convention and its implementing statutes contain no reference to prejudg-
ment attachment, and provide little guidance in this controversy." Carolina Power & Light
Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
34. The legislative history of the New York Convention's articles is summarized in
G.W. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
AWARDS (1958). The preparatory materials of the U.N. Conference on International Arbi-
tration, in which the Convention was adopted, are collected in U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26
(1958).
35. The introductory materials to the New York Convention are reprinted in INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 23, at pt. III.
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surmise the drafters' intent.3 6
C. MCCREARY AND ITS ADVOCATES: ARGUMENTS AGAINST
PRE-AWARD ATTACHMENT UNDER THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION
United States courts have found the attachment of assets as a
means to secure potential arbitral awards to be consistent with the
Arbitration Act.3 7 In order to determine the appropriate division of
judicial and arbitral roles under the New York Convention, an exami-
nation of the impact of U.S. implementation of the Convention upon
the pro-attachment posture of American courts is necessary.
Two commentators have argued that courts should not allow pre-
award attachment to supplement arbitral agreements that are gov-
erned by the Convention and that attachment is warranted only in
extraordinary circumstances. 38 They advance four contentions:
(1) pre-award attachment is unnecessary because the Convention
ensures international recognition of arbitral decisions and allows for
post-award attachment to satisfy arbitral awards; 39 (2) pre-award
attachment contradicts the Convention's objective of international
uniformity, because federal courts apply state attachment proce-
dures;4° (3) pre-award attachment contradicts international uniform-
ity, because attachment procedures are not available in all of the
signatory nations; 41 and (4) the Convention's provision that a court
"shall . . .refer the parties to arbitration" 42 precludes judicial inter-
vention in the arbitral process, such as granting a motion for pre-
award attachment.4 3
36. The paucity of information led one commentator to conclude accurately, "[Tihe
conference appears never to have addressed the issue of pre-award remedial procedures."
Note, Pre-Award Attachment Under the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 788, 791 (1981). Although the New
York Convention "gave the authority before which the award was sought to be relied upon
the right to order the party opposing the enforcement to give suitable security," this is only
in the context of post-award enforcement. Sanders, Court Decisions on the New York Con-
vention of 1958, IV Y.B. COM. ARB. 223, 237 (1979).
37. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
38. Note, Pre-A ward Attachment Under the U.N. Convention, supra note 36, at 801;
Note, Attachment Under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 36 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1135 (1979).
39. Note, Pre-Award Attachment Under the UN. Convention, supra note 36, at 802.
40. Id.
41. Note, Attachment Under the United Nations Convention, supra note 38, at 1141-42.
42. New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. II, § 3. See supra text accompanying
note 31 for the entire provision.
43. Note, Attachment Under the United Nations Convention, supra note 38, at 1141.
One commentator has suggested that the possibility of including provisions for pre-award
attachment in the New York Convention never occurred because none of the participants
in the actual drafting of the New York Convention were from countries that had similar
procedures, such as the United States. Mirabito, The United Nations Convention on the
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Two of these arguments were embraced in McCreary Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. CEA T S.p.A., 44 the first case in which a federal court was
forced to decide the compatibility of pre-award attachment with an
arbitral agreement governed by the Convention.45 In McCreary, the
plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, sued CEAT, an Italian corpora-
tion, for breach of contract. Although the contract provided for arbi-
tration of disputes in Brussels under Italian law,46 the plaintiff brought
suit in Pennsylvania state court and attached CEAT's assets pursuant
to state law.47 CEAT removed the action to federal district court and
moved to dissolve the attachment. The motion was denied.48
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's order and vacated the attachment order.
In order to justify its holding, the Third Circuit had to distinguish pre-
Convention cases that had held that the Arbitration Act's requirement
to "stay the trial of the action"4 9 did not preclude a court from requir-
ing parties to submit to arbitration or from enforcing provisional rem-
edies such as attachment.50 The Third Circuit held that the
Convention's provision that courts "shall. . .refer the parties to arbi-
tration" 5' 1 compels courts to send the entire controversy to the arbitral
body designated by the parties and to refrain from ordering pre-award
attachment. 52 In addition, the court remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to refer the disputed claims to arbitration pur-
suant to the parties' arbitration agreement.5 3
To support its interpretation of the Convention, the McCreary
court turned to the statutes implementing the Convention in the
United States. The court found that the provision for removal to fed-
eral court without regard to diversity or amount in controversy 54
demonstrated the "firm commitment of the Congress to the elimina-
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years, 5 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 471, 486 (1975).
44. 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974).
45. The parties' contract called for arbitration under the rules of the ICC, making the
New York Convention applicable to the arbitral agreement. Id at 1036.
46. Id at 1035.
47. In Balter v. Bato Co., 385 F. Supp. 420, 423 (W.D. Pa. 1974), the court explained
the purposes of the Pennsylvania foreign attachment statute. "In addition to the goal of
obtaining jurisdiction of an out-of-state defendant, the statute also ensures, until the
entrance of suitable bond, a fund or res from which the plaintiff is insured satisfaction at
least to some extent of any judgment he may obtain."
48. 501 F.2d at 1033.
49. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). For the full text of the provision, see infra note 65.
50. 501 F.2d at 1038.
51. New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. III, § 3. For the full text of this provi-
sion, see supra text accompanying note 31.
52. 501 F.2d at 1036-38.
53. 501 F.2d at 1038.
54. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982).
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tion of vestiges of judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agree-
ments, at least in the international commercial context."5 5 The court
also gleaned from the removal provision a congressional intent to pre-
vent the "vagaries of state [attachment] law"56 from interfering with
the workings of the New York Convention.
The McCreary court's interpretation of the Convention was con-
clusory. The court failed to explain how attachment would contradict
the Convention's goals of promoting uniformity and the recognition of
arbitral awards. It did not consider whether CEAT's assets would be
subject to attachment under Italian law.57 Moreover, the court did
not consider whether the plaintiff could enforce an arbitral award
without the help of an attachment order.
D. THE CAROLINA POWER RESPONSE TO MCCREARY
In Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex,58 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California took the position
that attachment is compatible vth the Convention. Following an
unprecedented rise in the price of uranium, Uranex refused to deliver
at the contract price and requested contract renegotiation. After insti-
tuting arbitral proceedings, Carolina Power and Light59 attached a
debt owed to Uranex by a third party in order to ensure that an award
from the arbitration would be enforceable. Uranex moved to quash
the writ of attachment, citing the McCreary holding.60
The court denied Uranex's motion to quash and held that
although it could not adjudicate the merits of the dispute, it could
maintain a limited form of jurisdiction sufficient to order attach-
ment.61 Thus, the court held that the parties' agreement to arbitrate,
55. 501 F.2d at 1037. The court cited with approval Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974) (U.S. adoption of New York Convention is strongly persuasive
evidence that the Convention is binding on the courts), suggesting that a contrary ruling
would provide courts with a means for interjecting their own views on the conformity of
attachment with the arbitration process at the expense of achieving international
uniformity.
56. 501 F.2d at 1038.
57. Italian courts have granted motions for attachment pending an arbitral decision.
See infra note 74.
58. 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
59. The plaintiff was a public utility that had entered into a contract for the delivery of
uranium concentrate from the defendant. 451 F. Supp. at 1054 n.6. The court apparently
granted attachment of the entire $85 million debt owed jointly to the defendant and non-
party coventurer because it could not determine what portion of the debt was owed specifi-
cally to the defendant. See id. at 1053-54.
60. Id. at 1049-50.
61. The court decided that under Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), a special type
of "attachment pending" jurisdiction was allowable despite the defendant's lack of mini-
mum contacts with the forum under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). 451 F. Supp. at 1046-49. "[A] fair reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Shaffer v. Heitner, requires that the application of notions of 'fair play and substantial
[Vol. 18:99
1985] PRE-AWARD ATTACHMENT
although governed by the New York Convention, did not bar attach-
ment pending the arbitral decision.62
Finding nothing in either the text or the legislative history of the
Convention concerning the availability of attachment pending arbitra-
tion,63 the court looked to the Arbitration Act for guidance. The
court found that the Arbitration Act, "which operates much like the
Convention for domestic agreements involving maritime or interstate
commerce, does not prohibit maintenance of a prejudgment attach-
ment during a stay pending arbitration." 64 The court based this con-
clusion on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the provision in
section 3 of the Arbitration Act that a court shall "stay the trial of the
action" 65 until arbitration.
The section obviously envisages action in a court on a cause of action and does
not oust the court's jurisdiction of the action, though the parties have agreed to
arbitrate. And, it would seem there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from
commencing the action by attachment if such procedure is available under the
applicable law.
66
The Carolina Power court concluded that the reasoning of the Arbitra-
tion Act cases-that attachment is consistent with judicial enforce-
ment of arbitral agreements-remains valid despite adoption of the
Convention. 67
The Carolina Power court rejected the McCreary court's depar-
ture from the Arbitration Act cases. The court based its rejection of
McCreary on the following arguments: (1) the textual differences
between the Arbitration Act and the Convention do not affect the
justice' include consideration of both the jeopardy to plaintiffs ultimate recovery and the
limited nature of the jurisdiction sought. . . ." kd at 1048. For a discussion of the juris-
dictional aspects of Carolina Power, see Note, Jurisdiction To Attach a Defendant's Property
Pending Adjudication in a Foreign Forum, 58 B.U.L. REv. 841 (1978). Despite the absence
of the traditionally required minimum contacts with the forum, the author concludes that
the exercise of jurisdiction pending arbitration is consistent with modem notions of fair-
ness. Ia at 852.
On the constitutionality of pre-arbitral attachment in light of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions upholding certain state sequestration procedures, see Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental
Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 637-40 (9th Cir. 1982).
62. 451 F. Supp. at 1062.
63. Id. at 1050-51.
64. Id. at 1051.
65. If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
- arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, pro-
viding that applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitra-
tion.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
66. 451 F. Supp. at 1051 (quoting The Anaconda v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 322 U.S.
42, 44-45 (1944)). See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 1052.
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availability of pre-award attachment; 68 (2) section 4 of the Arbitration
Act, which also grants district courts power to order parties to arbitra-
tion, has never been interpreted to deprive courts of their continuing
jurisdiction over the action;69 (3) although cases governed by the Con-
vention are removable to federal court, the Arbitration Act contains a
similar provision that has been held compatible with pre-award
attachment;70 and (4) "removal to federal court could have little
impact on the 'vagaries' of state provisional remedies, for pursuant to
Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the district courts
employ the procedures and remedies of the states where they sit."' 71
Finally, the Carolina Power court found support for its position in the
Supreme Court's conclusions that the availability of provisional reme-
dies such as attachment encourages use of nonjudicial methods of dis-
pute resolution.72
E. BEYOND CAROLINA POWER: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE PRE-AWARD ATTACHMENT
The absence of pre-award attachment would severely limit the
Convention's promotion of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Approximately 100 countries are not Convention signatories. This list
includes several countries involved in major commercial trading with
the United States, such as Brazil, Canada, and Saudi Arabia. 73 If a
party transfers assets to a nonmember country, the Convention cannot
be used to enforce an arbitral award rendered in a signatory nation.
Similarly, a party can liquidate or seclude assets within a signatory
68. The McCreary court makes two rather elliptical comments to distinguish the
United States Arbitration Act from the Convention. First, the court notes that the
Arbitration Act only directs courts to "stay the trial of the action," while the Con-
vention requires a court to "refer the parties to arbitration." 501 F.2d at 1038.
...The use of the general term "refer," however, might reflect little more than
the fact that the Convention must be applied in many very different legal systems,
and possibly in circumstances where the use of the technical term "stay" would not
be a meaningful directive.
Id at 1051-52 (footnote omitted).
69. Id at 1052.
70. Id The McCreary court concluded that the purpose of including a provision for
removal to federal court was "to prevent the vagaries of state law from impeding its [the
Convention's] full implementation." 501 F.2d at 1038. Yet, any case falling within section
4 of the Arbitration Act can also be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(1982). This suggests that removal jurisdiction had nothing to do with the Convention's
international scope.
71. 451 F. Supp. at 1052. See supra note 17.
72. Id at 1052. In Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970),
the Court concluded that the absence of equitable relief in the arbitration context presents a
serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring the peaceful resolution of labor
disputes under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, in other contexts, such as labor arbitra-
tion, the Supreme Court has found that provisional remedies aid arbitration. See id. at 249.
73. See 9 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General 611, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/1 (1981); VII Y.B. COM. ARB. 288-89 (1982).
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country to complicate or even to prevent the enforcement of an arbi-
tral award. Pre-award attachment is a workable solution to these
problems.
Pre-award attachment is also needed to supplement the limited
powers of arbitral bodies. "In virtually all countries, attachment, like
other provisional remedies involving coercion, cannot be ordered by
the arbitrator, but has to be applied for at the court." 74 Because arbi-
tral bodies generally lack power to grant attachment motions, "[i]f the
Convention did not allow the courts to grant any provisional remedy
in the presence of an arbitration agreement covered by the Conven-
tion, the arbitral award might be prevented from reaching any practi-
cal effect." 75
Some commentators contend that attachment contravenes the
Convention's purpose of promoting a uniform system for the interna-
tional recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements. 76
74. A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 23, at 140. "As the National Reports on the law of
arbitration in the Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration demonstrate, there is almost no law
which does not permit that a court be requested to order attachment as a provisional rem-
edy in aid of arbitration." I. at 143. See, eg., V Y.B. CoM. ARE., pt. IV (1980) (in most
countries a court may be requested to order attachment as a provisional remedy to aid
arbitration). Part IV of each National Report in the Yearbook sets forth recent amend-.
ments to arbitration statutes in each country.
In Scherk Enter. Aktiengesellschaft v. Societe des Grandes Marques, IV Y.B. COM.
APB. 286 (1979) (Corte. cass., Italy 1977), and in The Rena K, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 431 (Q.B.),
both cited in the Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/168 (1979), attach-
ment pending arbitral decision was found consistent with the New York Convention. In
The Rena K, the court held that pre-arbitral attachment is proper when the stay of litiga-
tion required under Article 11(3) of the New York Convention is temporary. [1978] 3
W.L.R. at 452. In considering the stay's effect on the attachment, the court noted that the
Convention does not require the release of security obtained through attachment when
such a stay is granted. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the decision whether to main-
tain the pre-arbitral attachment is governed not by the New York Convention, but rather
by the court's discretion in light of the facts of the case before it. Id Because the defen-
dants appeared unable to satisfy an arbitral award rendered against them, the court held
that maintaining the attachment would be appropriate. Id. at 454. The position taken in
Scherk and The Reva K is consistent with the rules of the International Chamber of Com-
merce. G. DULAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLE-
MENT OF DisPUTEs § 13.14 (1980). The 1975 ICC Rules, art. 8(5), provide,
Before the file is transmitted to the arbitrator, and in exceptional circumstances
even thereafter, the parties shall be at liberty to apply to any competent judicial
authority for interim or conservatory measures, and they shall not by so doing be
held to infringe the agreement to arbitrate or to affect the relevant powers reserved
to the arbitrator.
Id. at 97.
75. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 23, at pt. I.B.1. See
supra note 34.
76. See Note, Attachment Under the United Nations Convention, supra note 38, at 1141-
42. The author argues that the remedy of attachment, which U.S. law inherited from Eng-
lish common law, may be unavailable in other signatory nations with different legal tradi-
tions. The author also suggests that a U.S. court's decision to grant a motion for pre-award
attachment might undermine the Convention, because such a decision would imply that the
Convention could not effect foreign enforcement of an arbitral award. See also Note, Pre-
Award Attachment Under the U.N. Convention, supra note 36, at 802-03:
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Although the drafters of the Convention acknowledged the desirability
of unifying national laws on arbitration, they did not attempt to
achieve this goal through the Convention itself. Rather, they recom-
mended pursuit of this goal in a separate framework.77 Thus, even if
pre-award attachment does affect uniformity, attachment cannot be
said to contravene the goals of the New York Convention.
The Convention's silence on the availability of pre-award attach-
ment may represent a decision to leave the issue for determination by
the domestic law of each member nation until a uniform agreement
can be reached. For example, Article II, which requires member
countries to honor arbitral agreements "concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration, 78 does not indicate how to deter-
mine whether an arbitral agreement concerns this subject matter. This
omission has led one commentator to conclude, "The silence of Article
II would permit one to argue that the matter is to be determined by
the law selected by the parties . . .,79
Article V(1)(e) provides that enforcement of an award may be
refused upon a showing that the arbitral award was set aside by a
court in "the country in which, or under the law of which, the award
was made." °80 One Pommentator has concluded that the New York
First, the proponents of pre-award attachment have failed to demonstrate that
interim remedies under the Convention are necessary. Since post-award attach-
ment is available, an award may be enforced in any Contracting State in which the
respondent maintains assets.
Second, any benefits of pre-award attachment which may accrue to individual
firms are far outweighed by the dangers that attachment poses to the overall
scheme of international cooperation envisioned by the New York Convention. In
the United States, attachment procedures vary from state to state and each federal
district court is bound, at least in non-maritime cases, by the procedure of the state
in which it sits. Given these variations, other Contracting States may very well
view attachment in U.S. courts as unpredictable and idiosyncratic. As a result,
those States which have exercised the Convention's reciprocity reservation may
choose to view U.S. practice as an invitation to adopt rules of procedure which
serve parochial interests at variance with the objectives of the New York Conven-
tion. Moreover, other Contracting States may be discouraged from entering into
agreements to arbitrate with U.S. firms. Thus, there seems to be little reason to
favor pre-award attachment for reasons of efficiency when attachment subverts one
of the primary purposes of the New York Convention; viz., promotion of uniform-
ity of procedure surrounding enforcement of international arbitral awards.
77. The U.N. Conference on International Arbitration, which adopted the New York
Convention, rejected proposals to include procedural rules for enforcing arbitral awards in
the Convention. See U.N. Doc. E/Conf./26/2, at 4 (1958). This rejection led to a resolu-
tion that the Conference "considers that greater uniformity of national laws on arbitration
would further the effectiveness of arbitration in the settlement of private law disputes,...
and suggests that appropriate attention be given to defining suitable subject matter for
model arbitration statutes. . . ." Id. at 5-6.
78. New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. II, § 1. See supra note 31 for the full
text of this provision.
79. Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A. J. 821, 824 (1972).
80. New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. V(1)(c); 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
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Convention was built upon the presumption that "the award is gov-
erned by a national arbitration law since the setting aside of an award
belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court under whose arbitra-
tional law the award is made."81
Article III of the New York Convention requires that signatories
recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards using the procedural law
of the country where the arbitral award is to be relied on.8 2 In addi-
tion, Article III prohibits imposition of "substantially more onerous
conditions or higher fees or charges"8 3 for awards governed by the
Convention than are imposed on domestic arbitral awards. These pro-
visions suggest that the Convention was not intended to supplant
domestic law.
One commentator has interpreted the Convention's procedural
provisions as strong evidence of an intention to defer to domestic law.
There is no center or secretariat, there are no rules promulgated for conducting
arbitrations, there are no tribunals established for enforcing awards and there
are no minimum procedural standards created for the enforcement of awards.
The convention, while devoted to arbitration, is very much involved in national
judicial proceedings. The convention is directed to the competent authority,
presumably the courts, of each contracting state, and leaves much of its effec-
tiveness to the procedures of those courts and to the particular agreement
between the parties.8
4
Thus, courts should recognize that the drafters of the Convention
intended only to facilitate international enforcement of arbitral agree-
ments and their potential awards. 85 They should determine the availa-
bility of pre-award attachment under the Convention solely on the
basis of the law of the arbitral forum.86
81. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 23, at 37.
82. Article III of the New York Convention provides,
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall
not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on
the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies
than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. III; 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
83. New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. III, 9 U.S.C. § 201.
84. Quigley, supra note 79, at 822.
85. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86. Van den Berg has recognized that although the Convention makes a court incom-
petent to adjudicate the merits of a controversy, once the parties' arbitral agreement is
invoked, a court can still decide matters related to the arbitration. Examples of this contin-
uing competence include the appointment or replacement of arbitrators when the parties
have not provided for these possibilities in their agreement, the setting aside of an arbitral
award, and "the ordering of provisional remedies, especially attachment for securing the
sum or goods in dispute, irrespective of whether the arbitration is to take, or is taking, place
within its own district, or in a foreign country." A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 23, at 131.
This argument is strengthened by the fact that the Convention does not contain mecha-
nisms for the resolution of commercial controversies that differ from arbitration under the
arbitral law of the forum. Id at 143. Rather, the Convention's limited purpose of facilitat-
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II. PRE-AWARD ATTACHMENT IN MARITIME LAW
Admiralty courts have consistently upheld pre-award attachment
in cases that have addressed the compatibility of pre-award attach-
ment with the New York Convention. 87 An examination of relevant
aspects of admiralty law leads to the conclusion that these holdings
should be extended to all commercial cases. 88
A. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE IN U.S. COURTS
Several cases in which motions for pre-award attachment arose
despite the applicability of the New York Convention are governed by
the law of admiralty. This introduction presents a brief overview of
the aspects of admiralty that are relevant to the discussion that
follows.
The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United
States shall extend to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion." 89 These cases include actions connected in all manners with
maritime transportation, 90 as well as transactions occurring on all
bodies of water navigable in interstate and foreign commerce. 91 Until
1966, federal district courts had separate dockets and rules of proce-
dure for admiralty cases. "In 1966 the separate 'sides' were merged,
the admiralty 'suit' became a regular 'civil action', and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were made generally applicable ....
Despite this 'unification', the admiralty power remains a separate and
independent ground of jurisdiction, both constitutional and statu-
tory." 92 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not create any of
the four special maritime remedies for seizure of property, such as
maritime actions quasi in rem,93 which involve maritime attachment
ing international recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards suggests that the
question whether pre-award attachment should be available must be decided solely by ref-
erence to the law of the arbitral forum.
87. See infra notes 122-45 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 146-48.
89. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
90. On contracts for chartering ships (charter parties) and contracts for the carriage of
goods, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975).
91. Id. at 31-33.
Briefly, the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extends to all waters, salt or
fresh, with or without tides, natural or artificial, which are in fact navigable in
interstate or foreign water commerce, whether or not the particular body of water
is wholly within a state, and whether or not the occurrence or transaction that is
the subject-matter of the suit is confined to one state....
Occurences on foreign navigable waters may also ground admiralty jurisdiction.
Id at 31-32, 33 (footnotes omitted).
92. Id at 2 (emphasis in original).
93. The other maritime remedies for seizure of property are "maritime actions in rem
(with arrest or the property subject to lien); maritime actions for possession, partition, or
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or garnishment. Rather, the use of maritime attachment to vest a
court with personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant grew out
of a body of distinct substantive law that predated the U.S.
Constitution.94
Because the rules governing these special remedies relate only to
maritime actions, the four remedies were preserved in a set of Supple-
mental Rules to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.95 Supplemental
rule B's attachment procedure96 is the descendant of the writ of for-
eign attachment.97 One purpose of foreign attachment was to provide
the court with personal jurisdiction over a recalcitrant defendant. By
attaching the defendant's assets, the court expected the defendant to
appear within its jurisdiction in order to secure the assets' release; this
appearance gave the court an opportunity to acquire personal
jurisdiction.98
Attachment or garnishment is available for any admiralty claim
in personam.99 Rule B provides that a motion for attachment and gar-
nishment will be granted if "the defendant shall not be found within
the district"bo° where the plaintiff files his claim. The provision
trying title (involving similar arrest of the property claimed); and maritime actions for
exoneration or limitation of liability (involving the declaration of rights with distribution of
a fund deposited in court.)" 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: CIVIL § 3201 (1973).
94. See Currie, Unification of the Civil and Admiralty Rules: Why and How, 17 ME. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1965). The development of this body of law is also discussed in Manro v.
Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 489-92 (1825).
95. See Bradley, Admiralty Aspects of the Civil Rules, 41 F.R.D. 257, 261 (1966).
Actions involving the remedies listed in supplemental rule A are governed by the main
body of the rules only to the extent that they are consistent with the supplemental rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. A.
96. With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified com-
plaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and chat-
tels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees named in the complaint to the
amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found within the district. Such a
complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit signed by the plaintiff or his attor-
ney that, to the afflant's knowledge, or to the best of his information and belief, the
defendant cannot be found within the district. When a verified complaint is sup-
ported by such an affidavit the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and process
of attachment and garnishment. In addition, or in the alternative, the plaintiff
may, pursuant to Rule 4(e), invoke the remedies provided by state law for attach-
ment and garnishment or similar seizure of the defendant's property. Except for
Rule E(8) these Supplemental Rules do not apply to state remedies so invoked.
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(l).
97. See Note, Maritime Attachment Under Rule B: A Jurisdictional Disguise for an
Unconstitutional Security Attachment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 403, 407 (1977). "The pro-
cess of foreign attachment is known of old in admiralty. It has two purposes: to secure a
respondent's appearance and to assure satisfaction in case the suit is successful." Swift &
Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 693 (1950) (maritime
attachment appropriate despite lack of admiralty jurisdiction to inquire into alleged fraudu-
lent transfer).
98. Bjolstad v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 221 F. 692, 693-94 (N.D. Cal. 1914).
99. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 93, at § 3211.
100. For the full text of Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(l), see supra note 96.
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emphasizes the rule's jurisdictional rather than security aspect. Gar-
nishment was necessary for achieving personal jurisdiction, because
the pre-1966 Admiralty Rules limited service to the court's district.°10
The unification of civil and admiralty procedure has increased the
ability of federal courts sitting in admiralty to use supplemental rule B
as a security device when jurisdiction in personam already exists.102
Merger has expanded service of process, so that a court sitting in
admiralty may now serve a summons on a defendant "anywhere
within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is
held."10 3 Rule B, however, still states that maritime attachment will
be granted if "the defendant shall not be found within the district." 1 4
Thus, although a defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction
on the basis of in-state service,105 a party can forego service, electing
instead to attach pursuant to rule B;106 this transforms attachment
into a device for security.107 The following discussion shows that
courts have accepted the security function of attachment in admiralty
cases subject to arbitration.
101. The Admiralty Rules were promulgated in 1920. RULES OF PRACTICE IN ADMI-
RALTY AND MARITIME CASES, superceded by FED. R. Civ. P. SuPp. R.; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 historical and revision notes (1982); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 104 & n.40 (1969). Statewide service of process provi-
sions were part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since their promulgation in 1937.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(f). Because the Admiralty Rules continued to exist separately, it was
assumed that the territorial limits of service in admiralty were the boundaries of the dis-
trict. See ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON ADMIRALTY RULES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsrRICT COURTS, H.R. DOC.
No. 391, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE]. But see D/S A/S Flint v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 228 F.
Supp. 384, 388-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Cia Naviera Continental, S.A., 178 F.
Supp. 561, 564 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The Sabre Shipping court explained the means by
which some libelants avoided personal service in order to request attachment.
Instead of filing a libel in the United States District Court within which the respon-
dent maintains its principal office, to the knowledge of libelant, the libelant crosses
the East River, files the libel in this court and prays for the issuance of process in
personam with writ of foreign attachment.
228 F. Supp. at 385.
102. See Note, Maritime Attachment Under Rule B, supra note 97, at 405-07.
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. SUPP. R. B(l). For the full text of Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(l),
see supra note 96.
105. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 93, at § 3211.
106. See National Shipping & Trading Corp. v. Weeks Stevedoring Co., 252 F. Supp.
275 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
107. There is further evidence that rule B serves a security function that exceeds any
jurisdictional function; when a motion for attachment is granted based on the respondent's
absence from the district, it is not dissolved by the respondent's subsequent appearance.
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 693 (1950). See
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 101, at 66-67
('The Advisory Committee considered whether the rule on attachment and garnishment
[supplemental rule B] should. . . permit those remedies only when the defendant cannot
be found within the state and concluded that the remedy should not be so limited.").
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B. ATTACHMENT IN ADMIRALTY CASES UNDER THE
ARBITRATION ACT
Section 8 of the Arbitration Act allows the use of the traditional
admiralty procedure of libel and seizure l08 to promote compliance
with arbitration provisions and enforcement of potential arbitral
awards. Section 8 provides that if a cause of action is within the admi-
ralty power, a party may invoke "libel and seizure of the vessel or
other property" and "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct
the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction
to enter its decree on the award."' 0 9
In The Anaconda v. American Sugar Refining Co.,110 the United
States Supreme Court recognized a congressional intent to maintain a
plaintiff's right to acquire personal jurisdiction through libel and
seizure without sacrificing the right to enforce an arbitral agree-
ment. I I' Although attachment gives a court jurisdiction to compel a
party to honor an agreement to arbitrate, 112 the Anaconda Court sug-
gested that section 8's mandate to maintain attachment after compel-
ling arbitration also ensures the enforceability of arbitral awards.
13
A subsequent case demonstrated that the two purposes of attach-
ment under section 8, to acquire jurisdiction and to provide security,
were not interdependent. In Texas San Juan Oil Corp. v. An-Son Off-
108. 9 U.S.C. § 8 (1982). Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supple-
mental Rules now govern admiralty actions, courts rarely use nomenclature from the early
system. In the pre-merger cases the complaint was called the "libel," the plaintiff was the
"libelant," and defendant was the "respondent."
109. Id. Before enactment of the United States Arbitration Act of 1925, admiralty
courts lacked power to grant equitable relief and generally refused to aid the enforcement
of contractual provisions calling for arbitration. With the passage of the Act, the courts'
hostility toward their arbitral counterparts ended. See 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, ch.
VIII, § 103 (7th ed. 1958).
110. 322 U.S. 42 (1944).
111. [Section 8] plainly contemplates that one who has agreed to arbitrate may, nev-
ertheless, prosecute his cause of action in admiralty, and protects his opponent's
right to arbitration by court order. Far from ousting or permitting the parties to
the agreement to oust the court of jurisdiction of the cause of action that statute
recognizes the jurisdiction and saves the right of the aggrieved party to invoke it.
• .. [WIhatever its reasons, Congress plainly and emphatically declared that
although the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the traditional admiralty procedure
with its concomitant security should be available to the aggrieved party without in
any way lessening his obligation to arbitrate his grievance rather than litigate the
merits in court.
Id. at 45-46.
112. 9 U.S.C. § 8 (1982).
113. 322 U.S. at 46. Nonetheless, even a court with jurisdiction over a party cannot
order disposition of assets to satisfy an arbitral decision if the assets are not within the
court's territorial jurisdiction. J. MOORE, A. PELAEZ & J. WICKER, 7A MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE § B.04 (2d ed. 1983). See Ships & Freights, Inc. v. Farr, Whitlock & Co.,
188 F. Supp. 438, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
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shore Drilling Co., 114 the libelant filed a libel for attachment pursuant
to the arbitral provision of a charter party1 15 and section 8 of the Arbi-
tration Act following a contract dispute. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York issued a writ of foreign
attachment on a bank account within its jurisdiction. 16 The respon-
dent challenged the libel, contending that there was no allegation that
the libelant had demanded arbitration or that the respondent had
failed to arbitrate. 117 The court denied the motion to dismiss the
attachment. Embracing the Anaconda Court's reading of the purposes
behind section 8, the court refused to "force a party to choose between
arbitration, on the one hand, and his ancient admiralty right of juris-
diction in rem or by foreign attachment, on the other .... -118
Other cases go beyond allowing libel and seizure under the Arbi-
tration Act to fnstances in which there has been no allegation that the
defendant failed to comply with an arbitral provision. In one case,119
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York sitting in admiralty allowed attachment pursuant to section 8
even though arbitration had already commenced. 120 The court based
its conclusion on the Anaconda holding that attachment also serves a
security function under section 8.121
C. ADMIRALTY CASES UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
Admiralty courts, unlike their civil counterparts,1 22 have uni-
formly maintained the same pro-attachment posture following con-
gressional implementation of the New York Convention. Andros
Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie., S.A. 123 was the first admi-
ralty case in which a federal court recognized that pre-award attach-
ment does not undermine the goals of the New York Convention, but
instead encourages the use of arbitral provisions and supplements the
enforcement of arbitral awards in international commercial agree-
ments. In Andros, the plaintiff brought suit for demurrage 24 due
114. 194 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
115. See supra note 90.
116. 194 F. Supp. at 397.
117. Id. at 398.
118. Id.
119. Instituto Cubano de Establizacion del Azucar v. T/V Firbranch, 130 F. Supp. 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
120. Id. at 172.
121. Id. See supra note 111.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 37-72.
123. 430 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
124. Demurrage is the sum that is fixed in a contract or allowed to the owner of a ship as
remuneration for the detention of his vessel beyond the number of days allowed by the
charter party for loading and unloading or for sailing. See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Director
Gen. of India Supply Mission, 319 F. Supp. 821, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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under a charter party. Although the contract called for arbitration in
London, the plaintiff commenced suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York under the attachment
provisions of supplemental rule B. 125 The defendant moved to vacate
the attachment on the ground that the required arbitration was
already in progress.126
The court denied the motion to vacate attachment.1 27 First, the
court held that the plaintiff had validly invoked rule B to acquire juris-
diction over the defendant, because no one was authorized to receive
service of process within the district on the defendant's behalf. 28 Fur-
ther, the court held that because the plaintiff had met this requirement
for attachment under rule B, the plaintiff could invoke section 8 of the
Arbitration Act. "Section 8 is no more inimical to the Convention's
design-i.e., to encourage submissions of international commercial
disputes to arbitral proceedings . .. than it has been to the long-
standing federal policy. . . favoring resort to arbitration of disputes,
whether or not entirely domestic .... "129 The court found that
commencement of an action pursuant to section 8 is not an attempt to
bypass an arbitration provision and that retention of jurisdiction under
section 8 pending arbitration is consistent with the Convention, 130
because "Article IH(3), thus framed, surely may accommodate the
stays of litigation impliedly contemplated by Section 8, and expressly
directed by Section 3."131 The court's final conclusion was based on
pre-Convention cases that had reasoned that pre-award attachment
promotes the arbitral process by facilitating recovery on arbitral
awards. 132
125. 430 F. Supp. at 89-90.
126. Id. at 90. The defendant's argument was based on the McCreary analysis. See
supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
127. 430 F. Supp. at 95.
128. Id. In Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas
Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), section 8 of the Arbitration Act was given
a narrower reading. The court denied the plaintiff's attempt to invoke the traditional admi-
ralty attachment procedure of libel and seizure under section 8 because personal jurisdic-
tion could be achieved by service at an office the defendants maintained within the court's
jurisdiction. Id. at 4. The World Tanker court also determined that if plaintiffs subse-
quently prevailed at arbitration, the rules of the New York Convention would be available
to assure enforcement of their arbitral award. Relying on the McCreary analysis, the court
concluded that attachment prior to arbitration would create an "unnecessary and counter-
productive pressure on a situation which could otherwise be settled expeditiously and
knowledgeably in an arbitration context." Id. In Andros, even the defendant's willingness
to accept service of process did not stop the court from granting plaintiff's motion for
attachment pursuant to supplemental rule B. See 430 F. Supp. at 95.
129. 430 F. Supp. at 91.
130. Id. at 92.
131. Ia For the text of Article 11(3) of the New York Convention, see supra text
accompanying note 31.
132. See supra note 21. Pre-award attachment promotes efficient arbitration by "pre-
serving the subject matter or assets intact within the jurisdiction, thus making the (later)
19851
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A trend following the Andros analysis in the admiralty courts is
apparent. In Atlas Chartering Services, Inc. v. World Tanker Group,
Inc.,133 two foreign corporations entered into a charter party provid-
ing for London arbitration of all disputes. The plaintiff brought an
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York to compel arbitration and sought attachment of the defend-
ant's assets within the court's jurisdiction pursuant to supplemental
rule B.134
In granting the motion for attachment, the Atlas court addressed
whether pre-award attachment conflicts with the dictates of the New
York Convention. The court concluded that "a London arbitration
can proceed in an orderly fashion even though the defendant's assets
have been attached in New York as security for any award rendered
by the London panel." 135 The court based this conclusion on its view
that attachment is compatible with the Arbitration Act.
Certainly, the policy in favor of arbitration is at least as strong under the [Arbi-
tration] Act as under the Convention. Moreover, the prospect of pre-arbitra-
tion attachment has yielded neither interference with, nor reluctance to enter
into, domestic arbitration. Thus, we doubt that a decision permitting attach-
ment would discourage or hamper arbitration under the Convention. 136
The court's conclusion that pre-award attachment under section 8 of
the Arbitration Act and supplemental rule B is available to compel
arbitration under the New York Convention was limited to maritime
cases.
137
The argument that admiralty courts have transformed supple-
mental rule B into a security device extending beyond any jurisdic-
tional purpose 138 receives strong support from the United States
District Court's holding in Paramount Carriers Corp. v. Cook Indus-
tries, Inc. 139 After arbitration had begun in London, the plaintiff com-
menced an action in district court by obtaining a writ of attachment
pursuant to supplemental rule B. 140 The defendant argued that
attachment could not be used solely to obtain security and that the
security obtained through attachment is only incidental to the primary
goal of obtaining jurisdiction. 141 Thus, the defendant contended, the
award meaningful. Otherwise it might have been a pure formality, if assets had been taken
outside of the court's jurisdiction or wasted." M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBrIRATION § 26.02 (1968).
133. 453 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
134. Id. at 862.
135. Id. at 863.
136. Id.
131. Id.
138. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
139. 465 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
140. Id. at 600.
141. Id. at 601.
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plaintiff's commencement of the action solely to secure the claim in
the pending arbitration "was an abuse of the process of the Court." 142
Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiff had filed suit pri-
marily to obtain security through rule B attachment, 143 it did not
vacate the attachment. Rather, the court found attachment for secur-
ity to be entirely consistent with the New York Convention. 144 The
court based this ruling on Anaconda's view that a party's right to the
security function of traditional admiralty procedure is independent of
its jurisdictional function. 145
The admiralty courts' endorsement of attachment under supple-
mental rule B as compatible with the New York Convention bears on
the issue of the use of pre-award attachment in non-maritime cases.
The security function of attachment exists in non-maritime cases as
well; this suggests that pre-award attachment should be available in all
cases governed by the New York Convention. Whether courts allow
attachment to promote arbitration, to make arbitral awards meaning-
ful, or simply because they believe that attachment does not interfere
with the arbitral process, there is no reason to limit pre-award attach-
ment to admiralty cases.146 Commercial assets such as bank accounts
are now more readily transferable than the ships whose mobility
prompted the use of attachment in maritime law.147
The New York Convention's silence regarding pre-award attach-
ment suggests that if pre-award attachment is allowed in admiralty
cases, it should be allowed in all cases. The purpose of the Convention
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 602.
145. Id. at 601. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
146. In Cooper v. Ateliers de la Mbtobecane, S.A., 446 N.Y.S.2d 297, 86 A.D.2d 568,
rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 408, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 456 N.Y.S.2d 728 (N.Y. 1982), the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court of New York noted that any distinction between maritime cases
and non-maritime cases is artificial. "The purpose and language of the Convention and its
implementing legislation remain the same with reference to either admiralty or commercial
law." 446 N.Y.S.2d at 299, 86 A.D.2d at 570. Although the New York Court of Appeals
subsequently reversed, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York agreed with the dissenting opinion of Court of Appeals Judge Meyer.
[Tihe use of attachment in maritime contract cases arbitrated under the Federal
statute cannot properly be distinguished from arbitration-related attachment per-
mitted under State statutory and decisional law, for the U.N. Convention makes no
distinction; it either permits or proscribes both. In my view, absent more specific
language of proscription in the U.N. Convention, it permits both.
Construction Exporting Enter., Uneca v. Nikki Maritime Ltd., 558 F. Supp. 1372, 1375
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Cooper, 57 N.Y.2d at 416-17, 442 N.E.2d at 1243, 456 N.Y.S.2d at
732 (Meyer, J., dissenting)).
147. The need to attach now and notify later is as great now as it ever was, if not
greater. A ship can quietly slip its moorings and depart the jurisdiction. It can
easily take with it such tangible property as may be within the jurisdiction. And
credits can be quickly transferred elsewhere.
Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 637 (9th Cir. 1982).
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and its language are the same for all cases, whether in admiralty or
civil courts. It follows that the New York Convention must either
permit or prohibit pre-award attachment in both courts. 148 In light of
the Convention's deference to local law, pre-award attachment should
be permitted in both maritime and civil cases in U.S. courts.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING MOTIONS FOR
PRE-AWARD ATTACHMENT IN U.S. COURTS
Assuming the New York Convention's inapplicability to the issue
of pre-award attachment, it is relevant to ask what a U.S. court should
consider in deciding motions for attachment. This section assumes
that the merits of the plaintiff's case would justify granting a motion
for pre-award attachment. A plaintiff would bring a motion for pre-
award attachment in a U.S. court for one or both of the following
reasons. First, the parties have specified that the availability of pre-
award attachment would be decided under U.S. law. Second, the
assets that the plaintiff hopes to attach are in the United States. A
scenario like that in Carolina Power149 would present the strongest
case for justifying attachment, because the parties' contract calls for
arbitration in the United States and the defendant's assets are located
in the United States.
Nonetheless, there are also cases in which only one of the reasons
justifying attachment would be present. If the contract provides that
U.S. law will control the availability of attachment, but the assets to be
attached are located within another country, the court should grant
attachment. This will ensure that the plaintiff can enforce the judg-
ment in the forum where the defendant's assets are located.
The situation in which the plaintiff seeks attachment solely
because the defendant's assets are in the United States should be bro-
ken into two subcases. In the first subcase, the parties' contract
designates a non-U.S. arbitral forum but says nothing about judicial
remedies like attachment. In this instance, a U.S. court could grant
the motion for pre-award attachment. This result would follow from
the conclusion that if the parties had intended to limit all proceedings
to the arbitral forum, they easily could have worded their agreement
accordingly.1 50 This analysis may be criticized, however, for requiring
148. Cooper, 57 N.Y.2d at 416-17, 442 N.E.2d at 1243, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 732 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
149. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
150. For example, the arbitral agreement in McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1035, specified that
Italian law would apply, that the arbitration would be conducted under the rules of the
ICC, that the arbitrators would meet in Brussels, and that the proceeding would be in
English. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text. The arbitral agreement in Andros,
430 F. Supp. at 90, was much less elaborate, providing merely for final arbitration by two
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an unrealistic level of foresight at the contracting stage.
Another solution is to look to the applicable law, designated
explicitly by the parties or implicitly from the location of the arbitral
forum,151 for guidance. If the foreign law would allow pre-award
attachment, the motion should be granted unless a prior motion to the
foreign court for the attachment of assets located within its jurisdic-
tion has already been denied. Absent a strong showing of hardship,
the subsequent motion before a U.S. court should be denied out of
deference to the foreign court. This will further the Convention's goal
of promoting international recognition and enforcement of arbitral
agreements.
In the second subcase, the contract specifies that the law of the
foreign arbitral forum should also be applied. Again, a U.S. court
would have two options. The first would be to decide the motion for
attachment by applying the law of the arbitral forum, and the second
would be simply to refer the motion to a court within the country of
the arbitral forum designated by the parties, and to give recognition to
the judgment of the foreign court. The second approach, too, would
further the Convention's objectives.
CONCLUSION
The split in U.S. courts over the compatibility of pre-award
attachment with the purposes and policies of the New York Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
should be resolved in favor of pre-award attachment. The fact that the
New York Convention does not proscribe the national law of its mem-
ber forums nor provide an alternative system of arbitral rules supports
this conclusion. Because the New York Convention provides only for
the international enforcement of arbitral decisions rendered in its par-
ticipating states, attachment remains a question of national law dis-
tinct from the concerns and policies underlying the Convention.
arbitrators carrying on business in London. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying
text.
151. Although some arbitral agreements specify only the forum of the arbitration, other
agreements specify what law will be applied. If the agreement lacks a choice-of-law clause,
authority suggests that the forum clause creates a presumption that the court should apply
the law of the arbitral forum. See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d
915 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960) (provision calling for New York arbitration
"indicates a choice of law"); Campagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tuni-
sienne de Navigation S.A., [1970] 3 W.L.R. 389 (H.L.) (rebuttable presumption that
forum-choosing clause is intended to also choose forum law). See generally Smedresman,
Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Arbitration: A Survey of Recent Develop-
ments, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 263 (1977) (discussing the choice-of-law implications of arbi-
tral clauses). Under this analysis, the two types of arbitral agreements need not be
distinguished.
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Two lines of analysis suggest that pre-award attachment is com-
patible with arbitration under the New York Convention. First, the
long-standing U.S. policy of allowing attachment to further domestic
arbitration is equally applicable to international arbitration under the
New York Convention. Second, U.S. courts' allowance of maritime
attachment in admiralty cases arising under the New York Conven-
tion cannot be distinguished from similar civil controversies. On the
contrary, maritime attachment is the result of a strong U.S. policy in
favor of ensuring the enforceability of arbitral awards. This same pol-
icy applies with equal if not greater force to the use of attachment in
international commercial arbitration.
Kevin Jeffrey Brody*"
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